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The German Income Tax Reform 2000, which announced a reduction in income tax rates to 
be implemented in a series of three stages, was welcomed by the public as a step towards 
unleashing lurking growth potentials. Nonetheless, in the course of the year 2001 a dispute 
arose, centering around the question as to whether or not the later stages of the German 
Income Tax Reform should be brought forward. The present paper assesses the welfare and 
macroeconomic consequences of the German Income Tax Reform in the scope of a simplified 
DGE model of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff type and deals explicitly with the issue of bringing 
forward an already announced tax reform. As well as evaluating the considered fiscal policy 
options in terms of their (social) welfare implications we also touch on the political economy 
aspects of implementing a tax reform. 
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With the adoption of the Tax Reduction Act by the German Bundestag, on July 6, 2000 and its approval
by the Bundesrat, which represents the German states (BundeslÄ ander), the German Tax Reform was
passed into law by January 2001. Among other, one central element of the German Tax Reform was the
reduction of income tax rates to be implemented in a series of three stages. It is this element { henceforth
called the German Income Tax Reform (GITR) { which is in the very focus of this paper.
While the German Tax Reform was welcomed by the public as a step towards unleashing lurking growth
potentials, in the course of the year 2001 a dispute arose which centered around the question of whether
or not the later stages of the GITR should be brought forward as a means of stimulating the stuttering
engine of the German economy. However, because of the °oodings of the Elbe river in East Germany
during the summer 2002 such a proposal was rejected. Instead, the proposal was reversed as the German
government decided in the aftermath to postpone the already announced second stage of the GITR to
January 1, 2004 in order ¯nance the compensation payments to a®ected individuals and ¯rms for their
losses incurred. Nonetheless, for the same reasons as in 2001 a proposal to bring forward the last stage of
the GITR became again top of the political agenda during the course of the year 2003.1 As a consequence
of the public pressure the political decision makers agreed on a compromise, according to which the last
stage of the GITR is partly brought forward to January 1, 2004 and is thus put into place together with
the postponed second stage of the GITR. The remainder of the third stage will then follow on January 1,
2005.
The focus of the present paper is twofold. First, we try to assess the welfare and macroeconomic e®ects of
the GITR in the scope of a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the macroeconomic conditions
found in Germany. As such, the present paper is related to two strands in the literature. On the one hand
the paper ¯ts into the strand of literature concerning the e®ects of the German Tax Reform in general.
While the present paper deals only with GITR the literature so far concentrated mainly on the e®ects
of the German Business Tax Reform (GBTR).2 Within this literature only S¿rensen (2002) and Strulik
(2003) present an analysis of the e®ects of the GBTR in a general equilibrium framework. S¿rensen (2002)
1Interestingly, during the dispute in 2001 the conservative opposition advocated in favor of bringing the tax reform
forward, whereas the German government { a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens { refused such a proposal.
The government argued that the expansionary e®ect of an early tax reform is too small and thus will ¯zzle out, while on
the other hand an early tax reform, implying ceteris paribus a higher budget de¯cit, would con°ict with the government's
mid{term goal of presenting a balanced budget in 2006. Thus, government's resistance to bring forward the tax reform in
2001/02 may be seen as a means to build up their reputation as a consolidator of the national budget. However, during the
dispute in 2003 the opponents interchanged their views on the matter. Here it was the government which advocated in favor
of bringing the tax reform forward as a means of stimulating the economy, whereas the conservative opposition opposed such
a proposal on the grounds of the burdens already imposed on future generations by the high level of explicit and implicit
government debt.
2A short description of the central elements of the GBTR can be found in Homburg (2000) and Strulik (2003).
1analyzes the e®ects of the GBTR in the so called OECDTAX model which is a detailed general equilibrium
model of the OECD economy. More in line with the analysis of the present paper is the study by Strulik
(2003) who adopts a neoclassical growth framework in analyzing the 'supply-side economics' of the GBTR,
i.e. the e®ects on capital accumulation and welfare of a representative agent.3;4
On the other hand, the paper ¯ts into the literature on issues of taxation in dynamic general equilibrium
models initiated by Summers (1981). From the onset this literature followed the evolution of models in
macroeconomic and growth theory. Thus, beginning in the 1980s the neoclassical growth model with an ex-
ogenously given long run growth rate constituted the macroeconomic workhorse model. Besides Summers
(1981), contributions which ¯t into this framework include the work by Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and
Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) to mention only a few. Following the development of endogenous growth
theory in the 1980s the literature turned to analyzing the same questions in a macroeconomic environment
characterized by an endogenously determined long run rate of growth. Thereby the literature addressed
the question of whether taxation a®ects the long run growth rate of an economy. Concentrating on human
capital as the source of endogenous growth contributions in this line of research include Lucas (1990),
King and Rebelo (1990), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993), Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and GrÄ uner and
Heer (2000).5 Summarizing this literature, reducing the rate of income taxation boosts the accumulation
of both human and physical capital considerably in the long run and is accompanied by substantial long
run welfare gains, even if the welfare losses during transition are taken into account.6 Moreover, while the
welfare e®ects of reducing income tax rates are substantially magni¯ed in endogenous growth models, the
question of whether income taxation a®ects the long run growth rate of an economy is still open.7
However, in the light of the mentioned disputes in Germany of whether or not to bring forward the GITR
a second question arises: Does such a ¯scal policy step make any di®erence with respect to the welfare and
macroeconomic e®ects of the tax reform package? As to our best knowledge no one has ever addressed
this issue in the literature. On the one hand, the neglect of this issue may simply be explained by the
3While Strulik (2003) also includes the cut in the personal income tax rate, his analysis concentrates on the e®ects of the
German Tax Reform which are induced by changes in corporate taxation.
4Besides the mentioned general equilibrium studies the e®ects of the GBTR are also discussed in a less formal manner
by Leibfritz and Steinherr (1999), Sinn and Scholten (1999), Boss (2000), Homburg (2000), Schreiber (2000) and Keen
(2002).
5See Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) for a survey of the qualitative growth e®ects of di®erent forms of taxation in
endogenous growth models.
6While reviewing the literature we concentrated on representative agent models with ¯nite or in¯nite horizons. However,
in the scope of a heterogenous agent model reducing the tax rate on capital income may be accompanied with a welfare loss
as pointed out by Aiyagari (1995). He ¯nds that the actual capital income tax rate in the US may indeed be optimal in a
calibrated version of his model.
7Considering the empirical evidence for the US Stokey and Rebelo (1995) ¯nd that the dramatic rise in income tax
revenue in the early 1940s had no statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the growth rate of the US economy. Nonetheless, even
if the growth e®ects of tax reforms are small, the welfare e®ects may still be substantial as small changes in an economy's
growth rate accumulate over time, thereby a®ecting the level of macroeconomic variables substantially in the long run.
2fact that such a ¯scal policy step would result in only minor di®erences with respect to the long run
impact of the conducted tax reform, while the short and medium run e®ects are merely brought forward?
On the other hand, it is well known that in absence of bequests Ricardian Equivalence doesn't hold in
life{cycle economies populated by ¯nitely living representative agents. Hence, the long run impacts of
any ¯scal policy depend crucially on the intergenerational distribution of its bene¯ts and costs over time.
Therefore and second, we try to shed some light on this issue in the scope of an overlapping generations
model encompassing 59 generations and an endogenous labor supply decision. Speci¯cally, we confront
the option of conducting the GITR as originally scheduled with the option of bringing it forward. Besides
evaluating the di®erent ¯scal policy options in terms of their (social) welfare implications we also touch on
the political economy aspects of implementing a tax reform by asking whether a policy option will receive
the political support from a majority of the electorate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 speci¯es the model, while section 3 o®ers
a description of the model's calibration. The details of the investigated GITR as well as our results are
presented in Section 4. Finally, section 5 summarizes our ¯ndings and concludes the paper. An appendix
comments on the methodology applied to solve the model numerically.
2 The Model
In order to simplify the analysis, we consider a highly stylized closed economy overlapping generations
model in the spirit of Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965) and Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987). At every
point in time the economy is populated by I types of individuals (denoted by i = 1;:::;I) which di®er with
respect to age. Speci¯cally, at the beginning of each period t there is a 'newly born' youngest generation
i = 1 just entering the labor force. At the end of each period the members of the oldest generation i = I
die with certainty, while the members of each younger generation i (i = 1;:::;I ¡1) grow one 'year' older
and constitute the generation i+1 in the next period. Moreover, the population grows at a constant rate
´. Let the mass of individuals entering the labor force in period t = 0 be normalized to one. Then, if we
denote the mass of individuals of generation i at time t by Li(t) the demographic process for the economy
is summarized by
Li(t + 1) = (1 + ´)Li(t); (1)
and
Li(0) = (1 + ´)1¡i: (2)
Thus the population of the economy is stable, implying that the relative sizes of the cohorts do not change
over time.
32.1 Households
In each period t the representative household of generation i chooses consumption of goods and leisure




¯ku(ci+k(t + k);li+k(t + k)); (3)
where ci(t) and li(t) denote the consumption of goods and leisure of the representative household of
generation i in period t, while ¯ denotes the household's discount factor which re°ects pure time preference.





where 1=½ represents the (constant) intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption in dif-
ferent periods of life and Á is a parameter determining the household's preference for leisure.
Normalizing an individual's time endowment to unity, the representative household of generation i supplies
1¡li(t) units of raw labor in period t. In order to generate a realistic life{cycle earnings pro¯le we assume
that the household e®ectively supplies ²i e±ciency units for each unit of raw labor supplied. Besides
wage income an individual receives interest income on assets accumulated in the past. Thereby the asset
holdings of the representative household of generation i at the beginning of period t are denoted by ai(t).
Furthermore, households have to pay a personal income tax ¿i(t) on labor and capital income. We assume
that the tax system is given or may be approximated by a °at-rate tax
¿i(t) = (w(t)²i(1 ¡ li(t)) + r(t)ai(t))¿y(t); (4)
where ¿y(t) denotes the income tax rate in period t. Next, while we do not explicitly introduce any transfer
payments, e.g. pensions, into our model, the government levies a lump sum tax ¡tr(t), i.e. a negative
transfer, on all individuals alive in period t to ensure that its intertemporal budget constraint is balanced
in the long run.8 Finally, net income can be saved to accumulate further assets (ai+1(t + 1)) or spent
on consumption goods (ci(t)), where consumption expenditures are subject to a sales tax ¿c, which we
assume constant over time.
Hence, denoting the gross wage rate for raw labor by w(t) and the gross interest rate by r(t), the period
t budget constraint of the representative household of generation i reads
(1 + ¿c)ci(t) = (1 + r(t))ai(t) + ²i(1 ¡ li(t))w(t) + tr(t) ¡ ¿i(t) ¡ ai+1(t + 1)
= (1 + ~ r(t))ai(t) + ²i(1 ¡ li(t)) ~ w(t) + tr(t) ¡ ai+1(t + 1);
(5)
8While the transfer is indeed a lump sum tax, we still denote the variable tr(t) as transfers and interpret it as the cut in
transfer payments necessary to restore long run intertemporal budget balance. Thereby the change in utility following the
tax reform scenarios considered in later sections also re°ects the cost of these reforms.
4where ~ r(t) = (1¡¿y(t))r(t) and ~ w(t) = (1¡¿y(t))w(t). As we abstract from any bequest motives and since
there is no uncertainty concerning the deterministic life{span, the oldest generation I being in their last
life{cycle phase in period t consumes their entire wealth, while the asset level of the youngest generation
i = 1 is equal to zero, i.e.
aI+1(t + 1) = 0 (6)
a1(t) = 0 (7)
Given the utility function in equation (3), the budget constraint in equation (5), and the terminal and
initial conditions in equations (6) and (7) individuals choose consumption and leisure in each period such
that utility over their remaining life{time will be maximized.
2.2 Production Technology
Competitive ¯rms use labor and capital to produce output which can be used for both consumption and
investment. Production is characterized by constant returns to scale which ensures that the present value
of the ¯rms' pro¯ts will vanish in a world of perfectly competitive good markets. Because ¯rm size is
indeterminate under constant returns to scale, we can think of production as being carried out by a single
representative ¯rm. For simplicity we assume that the production technology of this representative ¯rm
is given by a Cobb{Douglas production function
Y (t) = F (K(t);X(t)N(t)) = (K(t))
® (X(t)N(t))
1¡® (8)
where Y (t), K(t), and N(t) are output, capital, and labor input at time t. ® re°ects the share of capital
income and 1 ¡ ® the total labor income share on GDP, while X(t) re°ects labor augmenting technical
progress at rate ° ¸ 0, i.e. X(t) follows the deterministic process
X(t + 1) = (1 + °)X(t):
Moreover, without loss of generality we can normalize labor productivity in the initial period t = 0 to one,
implying that X(t) = (1+°)t. Assuming that the amount of labor and capital employed can be adjusted
costlessly, perfect competition on capital and labor markets implies that factors of production are paid
their marginal product, that is
w(t) = FN (K(t);X(t)N(t)) = (1 ¡ ®)K(t)®X(t)1¡®N(t)¡® (9)
r(t) = FK (K(t);X(t)N(t)) ¡ ± = ®K(t)®¡1X(t)1¡®N(t)1¡® ¡ ±: (10)
5According to equation (9) labor should be employed up to the point where the marginal product of labor
equals the wage rate w(t), while equation (10) demands that the expected marginal product of capital
should be equal to the user cost of capital r(t) + ±.








Li(t)ai(t) ¡ B(t); (12)
where B(t) denotes the level of government debt in period t.
2.3 Public Sector
The public sector acts according to the uni¯ed budget principle, that is combined tax revenues ¯nance
total expenditures. Tax revenues T(t) consist of two components: 1) a comprehensive income tax on both
labor and capital income, and 2) a consumption tax in line with the VAT. Thus the government's overall




Li(t)(¿i(t) + ¿cci(t)): (13)
The government expenditures in period t are given by G(t) which re°ects the government's real purchase
of goods and services. Throughout we assume that the government always consumes a constant fraction g
of GDP so that government expenditures are given by G(t) = gY (t). Moreover, to ¯nance its expenditures
the government collects not only taxes but also draws resources from the private sector by issuing bonds
B(t+1) which are annually repayed and served with the interest rate prevailing in the economy. Finally,
as was noted above, in the periods following the implementation of a tax reform scenario the government
levies a lump sum tax ¡tr(t) on all individuals alive in period t to balance its intertemporal budget in the
long run. Speci¯cally, as of some period 0 < ¹ t < 1 the government chooses this lump sum tax such that
the level of government debt (adjusted for population and productivity growth) remains constant until
the economy reaches its new balanced growth path. Hence, the budget constraint of the public sector is
given by




0 for t < ¹ t, 0 < ¹ t < 1





6and º = (1 + °)(1 + ´) ¡ 1 denotes the growth rate of GDP along a balanced growth path.
2.4 Equilibrium
For a feasible government policy a competitive equilibrium of the economy just described is comprised
of (i) the solution to the household's utility maximization problem, (ii) the solution to the ¯rm's pro¯t
maximization problem and (iii) market clearing on goods and factor markets.
However, while the de¯nition of equilibrium just given corresponds to the standard notion of equilibrium
familiar from the theory of general equilibrium, it is not well suited for computational purposes as noted
by R¶ ³os-Rull (1996). Especially, if one formulates the problem at hand using the theory of dynamic
programming, the appropriate notion of equilibrium is recursive competitive equilibrium.9
Before de¯ning a recursive competitive equilibrium for our case, we ¯rst have to deal with the issue
of stationarity. More precisely, because of population and labor productivity growth the economy just
described is not stationary. But in the case of the assumed CRRA utility function it is possible to transform
the economy such that the transformed economy is stationary.10 Except for leisure individual variables
will grow with the rate of labor productivity (1 + °) along a balanced growth path, while aggregate
variables grow at a rate (1 + ´)(1 + °) with the exception of aggregate labor input which grows only
at a rate (1 + ´). Hence, stationarity can be achieved by simply dividing all individual variables as of
period t by X(t), while aggregate variables have to be divided by X(t)L(t). Thereby we eliminate the
deterministic trend present in the original economy. Furthermore, we have to adjust the wage rate for
labor productivity growth by dividing it by X(t). To ¯nish the transformation we also have to adjust the
individual discount rate ¯. Given the assumed CRRA form of the utility function this adjusted discount
rate in the transformed economy is given by ¯¤ = ¯(1+°)Á(1¡½). Applying the described transformations
and ignoring for the moment the dependence on time we arrive at the following de¯nitions of variables in
the transformed, stationary economy:
^ ai = ai=X; ^ ci = ci=X; ^ tr = tr=X; ^ li = li
^ B = B=(XL); ^ T = T=(XL); ^ G = G=(XL); ^ TR = TR=(XL)
^ K = K=(XL); ^ N = N=L; ^ w = w=X; ^ r = r
Secondly, adopting a recursive formulation for describing the model's solution requires one to think about
the relevant state variables. In our case the aggregate state of the economy at any point in time is fully
9The notion of recursive competitive equilibrium was introduced by Prescott and Mehra (1980). See also R¶ ³os-Rull (1996)
and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000).
10See King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and R¶ ³os-Rull (1996).
7described by the economy-wide distribution of assets and the level of government debt, as these variables
determine the economy's capital stock. Moreover, because of the considered tax reforms, the economic
environment changes over time such that the aggregate state of the economy depends explicitly on time.
From the perspective of the individual one has to add to these aggregate states the asset holdings of the
individual as an additional state variable.
Now, we are prepared for de¯ning a recursive competitive equilibrium for the transformed economy.
Denoting the economy-wide distribution of assets in the transformed economy by ^ A = (^ a1;:::;^ aI) let ^ Z =
( ^ A; ^ B). Moreover, let ¹i = Li(0)=L(0) = Li(t)=L(t) denote generation i's share on the total population.
Then, denoting next period variables by a prime (0) we have:
De¯nition: For a given path of income tax rates f¿y(t)g1
t=0, a recursive competitive equilibrium is com-
prised of a sequence of value functions fVi(^ a; ^ Z;t)gI
i=1 with corresponding policy functions for next periods
assets f^ a0
i(^ a; ^ Z;t)gI
i=1, consumption f^ ci(^ a; ^ Z;t)gI
i=1 and leisure fli(^ a; ^ Z;t)gI
i=1, functions determining ag-
gregate factor inputs ^ K( ^ Z;t) and ^ N( ^ Z;t), functions determining factor prices ^ w( ^ Z;t) and ^ r( ^ Z;t) and laws
of motion for the economy-wide asset distribution f ^ Hi( ^ Z;t)gI
i=1 and government debt ^ J( ^ Z;t) for all t,
such that





^ ci(^ ai; ^ Z;t) + (1 + º)^ a0
i(^ ai; ^ Z;t)
´
¡ (1 + º)J( ^ Z;t) =




¹i^ ai ¡ ^ B
!
(b) factor prices equal marginal productivities, i.e.
^ w( ^ Z;t) = FN( ^ K( ^ Z;t); ^ N( ^ Z;t))
^ r( ^ Z;t) = FK( ^ K( ^ Z;t); ^ N( ^ Z;t)) ¡ ±
(c) aggregate factor inputs are given by
^ K( ^ Z;t) =
I X
i=1
¹i^ ai ¡ ^ B
^ N( ^ Z;t) =
I X
i=1
¹i²i(1 ¡ li(^ ai; ^ Z;t))
8(d) taking the functions determining aggregate factor input and factor prices, as well as the laws of
motion for the asset distribution and government debt as given, the value and policy functions solve
the Bellman equation associated with the household's maximization problem
Vi(^ a; ^ Z;t) = max^ a0;^ c;^ l
n
u(^ c;^ l) + ¯¤Vi+1(^ a0;H( ^ Z;t);J( ^ Z;t);t + 1)
o
s.t. (1 + ¿c)^ c + (1 + °)^ a0 = (1 + ^ ~ r( ^ Z;t))^ a + ²i(1 ¡ ^ l) ^ ~ w( ^ Z;t) + ^ tr( ^ Z;t)
^ a0 = 0 , if i = I
^ a = 0 , if i = 1
VI+1(^ a0;H( ^ Z;t);J( ^ Z;t);t + 1) = 0;
where ^ ~ w( ^ Z;t) = (1 ¡ ¿y(t)) ^ w( ^ Z;t) and ^ ~ r( ^ Z;t) = (1 ¡ ¿y(t))^ r( ^ Z;t).
(e) the law of motion for the economy-wide asset distribution satis¯es
Hi( ^ Z;t) = 0; if i = 1
Hi+1( ^ Z;t) = ^ a0
i(^ ai; ^ Z;t); for i = 1;:::;I ¡ 1
(f) the law of motion for government debt obeys
(1 + º)J( ^ Z;t) = (1 + ^ r( ^ Z;t)) ^ B + gF( ^ K( ^ Z;t); ^ N( ^ Z;t)) + ^ TR( ^ Z;t) ¡ ^ T( ^ Z;t)
(g) tax revenue is given by







^ r( ^ Z;t)^ ai + ²i(1 ¡ ^ li(^ ai; ^ Z;t) ^ w( ^ Z;t))
´
+ ¿c^ ci(^ ai; ^ Z;t)
i
;
(h) aggregate and individual transfers are given by
^ TR( ^ Z;t) =
½
0 for t < ¹ t, 0 < ¹ t < 1
(º ¡ ^ r( ^ Z;t)) ^ B ¡ gF( ^ K( ^ Z;t); ^ N( ^ Z;t)) + ^ T( ^ Z;t) otherwise
^ tr( ^ Z;t) = ^ TR( ^ Z;t):
Before proceeding let us ¯rst comment on the equilibrium conditions. Condition (a) is merely the ag-
gregate feasibility constraint according to which output equals the sum of consumption, investment and
government expenditure, while condition (b) implies pro¯t maximization on the part of the ¯rms. Next,
condition (c) implies market clearing on factor markets, while condition (d) implies utility maximization
on the part of the households for given laws of motion for the aggregate states. According to condi-
tion (e) the law of motion for the economy-wide asset distribution coincides with the individual policy
9functions for next period's assets. Hence, as all agents are born with no assets the ¯rst equation merely
states that the assets of next period's generation 1 are zero, while the assets of next period's generations
i+1; i = 1;:::;I¡1 evolve according to this period's generation i's policy function for next period assets.
Finally, condition (f) demands that the law of motion for government debt satis¯es the government's per
period budget constraint, while conditions (g) and (h) replicate equations (13) and (15) which specify
the composition of aggregate tax revenue and our chosen rule for the path of lump sum taxes needed to
restore intertemporal budget balance.
3 Calibration
To add realism to the numerical simulations, we employ empirically signi¯cant parameter estimates from
the literature. Where these are not available, indirect methods and ad hoc assumptions have to be made.
Although our simulation approach yields numerical insights into real world policy making, the illustrative
character of the results should be borne in mind. The model's starting{point for the di®erent tax reform
proposals is calibrated to macroeconomic conditions, the legal system, and institutional settings presently
found in Germany (See Table (1) for a summary of the parameter values in our benchmark calibration
and Table (2) for a summary of the implied steady state values for major macroeconomic variables).11
Demographics As the expected lifetime of an representative individual at age 20 amounted to approx-
imately 78 years in 1999, the span of the life{cycle of an individual at age 20 amounts to 59 years.12 Thus
we set I = 59 in our model economy which thereby constitutes 59 overlapping generations. Furthermore,
in line with the demographics in Germany, we assume that the population grows with an annual rate of
0.25 percent per annum, which corresponds to the average over the period 1980-2000. Hence, the popula-
tion growth rate ´ is set to :0025. Finally, given our calibration individuals stop working at the age of 59
(model period 40). While this ¯gure is lower than the legal retirement age of 65, it actually corresponds
very well to the average retirement age which as a result of the possibilities and incentives for early retire-
ment amounted to the age of 60 in 2000 (VDR (2002), p. 111). However, while the implementation of the
tax reform may result in an earlier or later age of retirement, we impose the restriction that individuals
stop working at the age of 59 in order to simplify the computation of the transition path to the ¯nal
11If not otherwise stated, the data is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts for Germany (Volk-
swirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen) and the Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany (Statistisches
Jahrbuch fÄ ur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Both data sources are published by the Federal Statistical O±ce (Sta-
tistisches Bundesamt).
12The expected lifetime of a male (female) individual at age 20 amounted to 75 (81) years in 1999. Taking into account
the composition of the population, i.e. the share of male (female) individuals at age 20 or older but younger than 76 (82) in
the population amounted to 48.2 (51.8) percent in 2000, we thus computed the expected lifetime of an average individual.
10Parameter Value
Life{Cycle (I) 59
Population growth rate (´) .0025
Rate of technical progress (°) .0209
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (Á) .31
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/½) .3
Individual discount factor (¯) 1.011
Income tax rate (¿y) .177
Consumption tax rate (¿c) .16
Ratio of government expenditure to GDP (g) .19
Production Elasticity of Capital (®) .36
Depreciation Rate of Capital (±) .051
Table 1: Benchmark calibration of the model parameters
Macroeconomic variable K=Y I=K C=Y I=Y B=Y TY =Y TC=Y T=Y r
Implied value 3.022 .0745 .585 .225 1.6348 .1694 .0936 .263 .0681
Table 2: Values of major macroeconomic variables along the initial balanced growth path implied by the
benchmark calibration
steady state.
Households Following Hirte (2002) we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on a value of :3,
which implies a value of approximately 3:33 for the risk aversion parameter ½. As in R¶ ³os-Rull (1996) the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is chosen such that the average labor supply
corresponds to one third of the overall time endowment in the initial steady state. This is accomplished by
setting Á equal to :31. In accordance with R¶ ³os-Rull (1996) we choose a value of 1:011 for the individual
discount factor ¯. Finally, to generate a realistic life{cycle earnings pro¯le we calibrate the ²(i)'s using
data from the Socioeconomic Panel for Germany (SOEP). Speci¯cally, using data on annual earnings
and supply of labor hours we computed the implied supply of e±ciency units over the life{cycle. After
normalizing by the supplied e±ciency units of a 20 year old individual the resulting supply of e±ciency
units over the life{cycle is depicted in Figure 1.
Government While in the case of in¯nite horizon representative agent models Lucas (1990) and Men-
doza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) advocate for the use of average e®ective tax rates in calibrating income tax
rates, such a clear cut strategy is not available in the case of overlapping generations models. Nonetheless
we decided to follow this strategy in using the e®ective tax rate on personal income provided by Martinez-









Figure 1: Supply of e±ciency units over the life{cycle
Mongay (2000) as our measure of the income tax rate in the initial steady state.13 As a spin-o® the use
of this e®ective tax rate, which amounted to 17.7 percent in 2000, together with the calibration of the
production technology's parameters described below generates ratios of investment to augmented GNP
and capital to augmented GNP which correspond very well to the averages found in the data over the
period 1980-2000.14 Hence, in our benchmark calibration we set the income tax rate ¿y equal to :177.
Next, as in the legal system of Germany we choose a value of 16 percent for the consumption tax rate.
Hence, ¿c is set equal to :16. Finally, as the average ratio of government expenditure to GDP over the
period 1980-2000 amounted to 19 percent we set the parameter g on a value of :19. However, note that our
calibration induces a ratio of government debt to GDP of 163 percent along the initial balanced growth
path which is substantially higher than the value in 2000 which amounted to 59 percent.15
13Note that the procedure used by Martinez-Mongay (2000) in computing e®ective tax rates di®ers somewhat from the
one adopted by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) and Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). However, compared to these
other studies the e®ective tax rates provided by Martinez-Mongay (2000) range up to the year 2001. More importantly
corresponding to the income tax rate in our model he provides a comprehensive measure of the income tax rate including
both income from capital and labor.
14As described below our de¯nition of the economy's capital stock includes the government's capital stock. Therefore,
measured GNP has to be augmented by the °ow of services from government capital.
15On the other hand, if one adopts a broad de¯nition of government debt including both explicit and implicit government
debt our ratio of government debt to GDP of 163 percent corresponds very well to the ¯gure found in the data as documented
by Fetzer, Moog, and Ra®elhÄ uschen (2002) using the method of Generational Accounting. These authors ¯nd that the
sustainability gap, de¯ned as the sum of explicit and implicit government debt, amounts to 162 percent of GDP in the base
year 1999.
12Production To calibrate the capital income share ® we followed the procedure outlined in Cooley and
Prescott (1995). Thereby our de¯nition of the economy's capital stock includes ¯xed private capital and
the government's capital stock. Accordingly we also augment measured GNP to include the °ow of services
from government capital. Corresponding to the average over the period 1980-2000 we choose a capital
income share of ® = :36. The depreciation rate of the overall capital stock is calibrated to generate a
ratio of investment to capital stock of approximately :0745 in the initial steady state, which corresponds
to the average over the period 1980-2000. This is ensured by setting the depreciation rate ± equal to :051.
Finally, as the average growth rate of GNP per capita over the period 1980-2000 amounted to 2:09 percent
the growth rate of labor productivity ° is set equal to :0209.
4 The German Income Tax Reform
4.1 Issues and Instruments
With the adoption of the Tax Reduction Act by the German Bundestag, on July 6, 2000 and its approval
by the Bundesrat, which represents the German states (BundeslÄ ander), the German Tax Reform was
passed into law by January 2001. Among other, one central element of the latest German Tax Reform is
the GITR. As originally outlined the GITR implied a reduction of income tax rates to be implemented
over time in a series of three stages as of 2001, 2003 and 2005.
In the ¯rst stage of the GITR, started on January 1, 2001, the basic income tax rate has fallen to 19:9
percent, the top rate was cut from 51 to 48:5 percent while the basic personal allowance was increased
by EUR 494 to approximately EUR 7,206.16 During the second stage, which should have been started
on January 1, 2003 the basic personal allowance would have been increased to EUR 7,426, the basic tax
rate cut to 17 percent and the top rate fallen to 47 percent. But, as already outlined in the introduction
the German government decided in the aftermath of the °oodings of the Elbe river in summer 2002, with
agreement of the oppositional conservative party, to postpone the already announced second stage of the
GITR to January 1, 2004 in order ¯nance the compensation payments to a®ected individuals and ¯rms
for their losses incurred. Finally, as from January 1, 2005 it was planned to put the third stage into place,
which would have increased the basic personal allowance to EUR 7,664, while the basic tax rate would
have been reduced to 15 percent and the top rate brought down to 42 percent. However, as a means
of stimulating the stagnating German economy, the political decision makers agreed on a compromise,
according to which the last stage of the GITR is partly brought forward to January 1, 2004 and thus set
16The ¯rst stage of the German Tax Reform was in fact the third stage of the Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002, with the
2002 stage brought forward by one year to January 1, 2001.
13into place together with the postponed second stage of the GITR, while the remainder of the third stage
will follow on January 1, 2005.
In the following simulations we consider only a stylized version of the GITR. Speci¯cally we do not consider
the series of tax reforms corresponding to the three stages of the GITR. Instead we assume that all stages
of the GITR are implemented at once at the date of implementation of the third stage of the GITR.
Thereby, our status quo scenario corresponds to the legal status quo as of the year 2000. Accordingly the
timing in our model is as follows. In 2000 (model period t = 0) the economy is on its initial balanced
growth path. Corresponding to the implementation of the ¯rst stage of the GITR in 2001 (t = 1) the tax
reform in our model is announced to be implemented in 2005 (t = 5). In the 'early tax reform' scenario we
concentrate on the actual status quo where the tax reform is brought forward by one year to 2004 (t = 4).
Thereby, this change in the government's policy is announced in the year 2003 (t = 3).
Because of the GITR average income tax rates will fall on average by approximately 4 percentage points
after the implementation of the ¯nal stage. However, as the average income tax rate overstates the e®ective
income tax rate employed in the process of calibration we assume that income tax rates will fall by only 2
percentage points.17 Thus, in all of our simulations we lower the income tax rate by this amount, setting
¿y equal to :157 after the tax reform is implemented.
Finally, as was already noted in previous sections, the cut in income tax rates is accompanied by a
countervailing cut in government transfer payments in future periods to restore intertemporal budget
balance. Speci¯cally, as of some period ¹ t the lump sum tax is speci¯ed such that the level of government
debt (adjusted for productivity and population growth) remains constant until the economy reaches its
new long run balanced growth path. The countervailing change in ¯scal policy thus speci¯ed, it remains
to specify the date ¹ t at which it will be implemented. Corresponding to the year 2005 we decided to
set ¹ t equal to 5 in our simulations. This choice of ¹ t re°ects the government's original plan to ¯nance
the tax reform without incurring further debt. Hence, in the status quo scenario the government holds
the level of government debt constant after the implementation of the tax reform, thereby allowing the
ratio of government debt to GDP to change until the new balanced growth path is reached. On the other
hand, together with the decision to bringing forward the tax reform by one year the political decision
makers agreed on partially ¯nancing this ¯scal policy step by issuing further debt. Therefore, in the early
tax reform scenario the level of government debt is allowed to change for one period and hold constant
thereafter.
17Note that Martinez-Mongay (2000) provide an estimate of the e®ective income tax rate in the year 2001 which amounts to
15:9 percent. Hence, assuming that the e®ective income tax rate will fall by only 2 percentage points after the implementation
of all three stages may indeed understate the true drop in e®ective income tax rates.
144.2 Results
The Status Quo Scenario The results of our simulations are presented in Table 3.18 Consider ¯rst
the macroeconomic e®ects in the status quo scenario. Compared to the initial balanced growth path
(henceforth abbreviated BGP) the capital stock is higher for all periods after the announcement of the
reform as can be seen from the line labelled KSQ. Moreover, the capital stock increases steadily along
the transition path, resulting in a long run increase of 4:3 percent. Considering e®ective labor supply we
see from the line labelled NSQ that e®ective labor supply is always larger, slightly increasing in the ¯rst
periods after the announcement, overshooting its long run value as of the period of the implementation of
the tax reform and declining thereafter to result in a 1:6 percent increase in the long run. This said, it is
clear that output is always higher along the transition path, resulting in a long run rise of 2:6 percent as
can be seen from the line labelled Y SQ.








Figure 2: Percentage change in the age distribution of life{cycle resources after the announcement of the
tax reform in period t = 1
Next, consider the e®ects on consumption. In a model with an in¯nitely living representative agent one
would expect consumption to rise as a result of the positive wealth e®ect induced by the future decline in






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Percentage change in the age distribution of life{cycle tax liabilities after the announcement of
the tax reform in period t = 1
income tax rates. Contrary to this consumption declines following the announcement of the tax reform
in our simulation as can be seen from the line labelled CSQ. This is a consequence of the overlapping
generations structure of our model. As can be seen from Figure 2, which depicts the percentage change in
the age distribution of life{cycle resources as of period t = 1, the young generations up to age 38 bene¯t
in terms of life{cycle resources. On the other hand, the middle and old aged between age 39 and 74 lose in
terms of life{cycle resources, while the very old are virtually not a®ected. This pattern can be explained
by the fact that the lump sum tax imposed to balance the intertemporal budget is distributed equally on
all living generations and to a lesser extent by the di®ering supply of e±ciency units over the life{cycle.
Speci¯cally, as the lump sum tax substitutes for both the distorting tax on capital and labor income the
bene¯ts of the tax reform are unequally distributed because only individuals up to age 59 work at all,
while the cost of the tax reform, i.e. the lump sum tax imposed, are equally distributed on all individuals.
This unequal distribution of the bene¯ts and costs of the tax reform in terms of tax liabilities is evident
from Figure 3 which depicts the percentage change in the age distribution of tax liabilities as of period
t = 1. Hence, the middle and old aged individuals bene¯t only partially from the reduced income tax
rates but have to fully contribute for the ¯nancing of the tax reform. Moreover, as a result of lower wages
17up to period t = 8 all working age generations initially lose. But for the young generations this loss in
labor income is not that serious as they supply only a small amount of e±ciency units, while, being at the
beginning of their life{cycle, they bene¯t much from the future rise in wages which hits them when they
are near the maximum of the e±ciency units pro¯le. For the same reasons the middle aged older than 39
are initially hurt the most as their loss of labor income due to declining wages is magni¯ed because they
supply to a greater or lesser extent the maximum of e±ciency units, while on the other hand bene¯tting
only to a lesser extent from the future rise in wages which hits them when they are on the declining branch
of the e±ciency units pro¯le or already retired. Hence, as the majority of living generations lose in terms
of life{cycle resources it should be clear why consumption declines initially, while steadily rising after the
tax reform is implemented to result in an long run increase of 1:9 percent.19
As savings are the mirror image of consumption, savings and therefore investment in our economy rise
initially as can be seen from the line labelled ISQ, thereby providing the funds needed to build up the
higher capital stock. Besides the drop in consumption, investment rises as a result of the increasing
output. Thereby, the fact that investment's share on GDP amounts to only 22:5 percent along the initial
BGP explains the comparatively large reaction of investment. Like e±cient labor supply investment rises
steadily in the following periods, overshooting its long run value as of the moment when the tax reform is
implemented and declining thereafter to result in a long run increase of 4:3 percent which needless to say
is equal to the long run increase in the capital stock.
Next, consider the e®ects on government debt and tax revenue. As was already pointed out output rises
while consumption initially declines. Therefore government's revenue from consumption taxation declines,
while revenue from income taxation rises as is evident from the line labelled T
SQ
Y . Taken both components
together we see from the line labelled TSQ that tax revenues initially decline thereby inducing a higher
budget de¯cit which must be ¯nanced by accumulating additional debt. Hence, government debt merely
rises as a result of the announcement of the tax reform. Because of our rule to balance the government's
intertemporal budget this slightly higher level of government debt is maintained until the economy reaches
its new BGP along which government debt is 0:1 percent higher than along the initial BGP. Note however,
that the ratio of government debt to GDP falls by approximately 2:5 percent in the long run, which can be
19Note that there is also a substitution e®ect present as the net interest rate increases initially as a result of the slight
increase in the before{tax interest rate and later on as a result of the decline in the income tax rate. Hence, as this rise in
the net interest rate reduces the relative price of future consumption individuals substitute present for future consumption
thereby contributing to the initial decline and later rise in consumption.
18seen from subtracting the percentage change in government debt from the percentage change in output.
Of course, holding the level of government debt constant was achieved by raising additional revenue
through the imposition of a lump sum tax or as we interpret it, by a corresponding reduction in government
transfers. As can be seen from the line labelled TRSQ, which contrary to the other variables considered
expresses the cut in transfers as a share of GDP along the initial BGP, transfers must be cut by 2:1
percentage points as of the period when the tax reform is implemented. But as output and consumption
increase in the following so does revenue from both consumption and income taxation. Hence, the share
by which transfers must be cut declines following the implementation period to result in a long run cut of
1:7 percentage points. As the share of government transfer payments on GDP amounted to approximately
31:8 percent in 2000 cutting transfers by 1:7 percentage points implies bringing the share of government
transfers moderately down to the value at the beginning of the 1990s.
Finally, the ultimate criterion for the evaluation of a ¯scal policy change is its e®ect on the welfare of the
individuals. Because of the individual heterogeneity present in an overlapping generations model there will
be winners and losers of the tax reform proposal as we have already seen above. Thus welfare judgements
based on the Pareto criterion are impossible. Therefore we consider as a ¯rst step the implications of the
considered tax reform proposal on the welfare of the respective newborn individual in each period which
can be read o® the line labelled U
SQ
1 . As can be seen the welfare of a newborn individual in period t = 1
rises on impact by 1:4 percent, declining thereafter for the respective newborn in this period and beginning
to rise again as of the moment when the tax reform is implemented to result in a long run welfare gain of
3:1 percent. Hence, in terms of its long run welfare implications the considered tax reform proposal is a
good thing to do.
The Early Tax Reform Scenario As we have already discussed the results for our status quo scenario
we are now prepared to compare these results to the case where the tax reform is brought forward by
one year. As this ¯scal policy step is ¯rst announced in period t = 3 the transition path in the early
tax reform scenario merely replicates the transition path in the status quo scenario for periods t = 1 and
t = 2. Starting with the announcement of bringing the tax reform forward in period t = 3 the transition
paths in the two scenarios evolve di®erently. Comparing the lines superscripted SQ and ET in Table 3 one
sees that on impact the macroeconomic e®ects of the tax reform are to a greater or lesser extent merely
19brought forward by one year. However, taking a glance on the long run impacts of the tax reform under
the two scenarios one sees from comparing the lines labelled BET and BSQ that government debt rises by
1:4 percent in the early tax reform scenario compared to only :1 percent in the status quo scenario. But
as the decision to bring forward the tax reform was accompanied by the decision to fund this ¯scal policy
step through the additional accumulation of debt this di®erence should come as no surprise. However,
this di®erence in the evolution of government debt is the key for the explanation of the slight variations in
the evolution of the other macroeconomic aggregates. As the government draws on the resources provided
by the private sector to fund the higher level of government debt private investment is partially crowded
out, resulting in a slightly lower increase of both investment and the capital stock. However, as the higher
level of government debt implies a slightly larger cut in transfers necessary to balance the government's
intertemporal budget in the long run this e®ect is partially compensated for by a slightly larger rise in
e®ective labor supply so that output is only :1 percentage points smaller in the long run. Moreover, as a
smaller capital stock demands only a lower level of investment consumption is virtually not a®ected. The
same is true for tax revenues which as a result of a negligible e®ect on revenues from consumption taxation
are virtually not a®ected despite the fact that revenues from income taxation are lower by 0:1 percentage
points. Nonetheless, comparing the lines labelled UET
1 and U
SQ
1 one sees that the long run welfare impact
of bringing the tax reform forward amounts to only 2:3 percent and is thus :8 percentage points lower as
in the status quo scenario, which is mainly a result of the negative welfare e®ect induced by the rise in
individual labor supply or expressed in di®erent words a result of the lower consumption of leisure. Hence,
judged by its long run welfare implications bringing forward the tax reform by one year was a bad thing
to do. On the other hand, as the political decision makers aimed at stimulating the 'stuttering engine'
of the economy by bringing forward the tax reform our results can be interpreted as a con¯rmation of
these expectations. However, at least in our model this growth impulse is independent of whether the tax
reform is ¯nanced by a cut in transfer payments or by accumulating debt. Thus, the decision to fund the
earlier tax reform by accumulating further debt implies that the cost of the tax reform are to a greater
extent distributed towards the future generations. On the other hand, as was shown above, the middle
and old aged generations are the losers of the tax reform proposal so that bringing the tax reform forward
may be seen as a means of distributing the costs of the tax reform more evenly across present and future
20generations.20 All in all the future generations still gain a non-negligible 2:3 percent in terms of utility.
4.3 Social Welfare Analysis and Political Economy Aspects of Bringing For-
ward a Tax Reform
In the preceding subsection we already touched on welfare issues by considering the e®ects of our tax
reform scenarios on the welfare of newborn individuals. In this subsection we adopt a social welfare
perspective as an additional welfare criterion. Thereby we assume a standard utilitarian social welfare
function by simply summing up the utility indices of all presently living and future generations over their
remaining life{time. As this summation reaches into the in¯nite future we have to discount the utility
indices of future generations. Speci¯cally, the assumed social discount factor ¯soc is set on a value of
0:99.21 Moreover, besides the social welfare analysis we touch the political economy aspects of our tax
reform scenarios by asking the question which reform scenario might win a majority vote. Thereby we
assume that an individual will vote for the option under which it reaches the higher welfare level.
The results of the social welfare analysis are presented in Table 4. First we ask whether the GITR should
have been adopted at all by comparing our status quo scenario against the initial BGP. As the tax reform
in the status quo scenario is announced in model period t = 1, this is the relevant comparison period in
this case. As can be seen from the ¯rst line of Table 4 adopting the GITR was the right thing to do in
terms of social welfare. This is not that surprising as we already saw in the preceding subsection that
the tax reform is accompanied by a non-negligible positive welfare e®ect in the long run. Next, we ask
whether the tax reform should have been brought forward by comparing our status quo scenario against
the early tax reform scenario. Thereby model period t = 3 is the relevant comparison period as the ¯scal
policy option to bring forward the tax reform is announced in period t = 3. Now, as can be seen from
the second line of Table 4 bringing forward the tax reform was a bad thing to do judged by its social
welfare implications. Once more, this result shouldn't come as a surprise as the status quo scenario already
outperformed the early tax reform scenario in terms of its long run welfare impact.
As already mentioned above we next adopt a political economy perspective by asking whether a tax reform
option will win a majority vote against the option of remaining on the current growth path. The results
20However, note that Germany's current ¯scal policy already implies a substantial amount of intergenerational redistri-
bution at the expense of future generations as documented by Ehrentraut and Ra®elhÄ uschen (2003) using the method of
Generational Accounting.
21In accordance with the transformation of our economy described above the social discount rate has to be transformed
as well. The social discount rate in our transformed economy is then given by ¯¤
soc = ¯soc(1 + ´)(1 + °)Á(1¡½).
21Comparison Period initial BGP Status Quo Early Tax Reform
1 2748.0 2756.8
3 2689.5 2686.5
Table 4: Social Welfare Analysis
Comparison Period initial BGP Status Quo Early Tax Reform
1 62 38
3 3 97
Table 5: Political Economy Results
of this political economy experiment are presented in Table 5. Once more we ¯rst consider the question
whether the GITR should have been adopted at all if judged against the option of remaining on the initial
BGP. As can be seen from the ¯rst line of Table 5 in the scope of our model the GITR proposal wouldn't
been adopted if the individuals where given the possibility of a vote. Speci¯cally only 38 percent of the
electorate would vote for the GITR, while the remaining 62 percent would vote for the option of remaining
on the initial BGP despite the fact that the former outperforms the latter in terms of its long run welfare
impact. This result is driven by the already mentioned fact that only the young generations win by the
adoption of the GITR, while the mass of the old and middle aged generations lose because as a matter
of fact these generations reap only part of the bene¯ts of the lower taxation of labor income while at the
same time have to fully contribute for the funding of the tax reform through the lump sum tax imposed
uniformly on all living generations (See Figures 2 and 3).
On the other hand, assuming that the GITR was adopted initially in period t = 1 we see from the
second line in Table 5 that the option of bringing the tax reform forward by one year will win a majority
vote against the option to remain on the transition path pursued by the initial adoption of the GITR.
Speci¯cally, an overwhelming share of 97 percent of the electorate would vote in favor of bringing the
tax reform forward by one year, while only 3 percent would like to stay on the road pursued by the
initial adoption of the GITR. Once more this result is driven by the middle aged who in principal oppose
the adoption of the GITR at all but on the other hand prefer having the tax reform implemented at
a date as early as possible to bene¯t as much as possible from the lower income tax rate, while their
contribution towards expenses remains almost the same because bringing forward the tax reform is ¯nanced
by accumulating government debt.
224.4 Sensitivity
In the following subsection we consider the sensitivity of our results with respect to some of the key
parameters of our model. Thereby we concentrate on the di®erences with respect to the long run impact
on the major macroeconomic aggregates. The results of our sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 6.
First we consider the sensitivity with respect to the discount factor ¯. As can be seen from column 2 setting
¯ on a lower value of 0:99 has only minor consequences for the long run impact on the macroeconomic
aggregates. But as a lower ¯ implies that individuals become more impatient the long run change in
welfare is less than one fourth of the one in our benchmark calibration. The same holds for the case
Á = 0:2 in column 3, which implies a more elastic supply of labor. Although the long run impact on
capital, e®ective labor supply, output and consumption is slightly larger, while the impact on government
debt in our early tax reform scenario is slightly smaller, the long run welfare change is approximately cut
in half compared to our benchmark. But as labor supply increases this comes as no surprise as Á = 0:2
implies a larger weight of leisure in our subutility index which is made up of consumption and leisure.
Next we consider the case Á = 1, which implies that labor is inelastically supplied. In this case the long
run impact on the macroeconomic aggregates is considerably smaller as can be seen from column 4. In
particular, compared to all other cases our two scenarios di®er considerably with respect to their long
run impact. This is a result of the fact that in the case of an inelastic labor supply individuals are less
°exible in responding to a change in ¯scal policy. Speci¯cally, in the case of an inelastic labor supply
individuals are less willing to increase their amount of savings, as this implies a corresponding drop in
present consumption. Contrary to this, in our benchmark calibration this drop in consumption levels is
partially compensated for by an increase in labor supply. Because of this lower willingness to save in the
case of an inelastic labor supply the e®ect of an increase in government debt on private investment is
magni¯ed compared to our benchmark calibration, which explains the di®erences between our tax reform
scenarios in this case. Moreover, as one can see from the last two lines it no longer holds that the tax
reform is accompanied by a long run welfare gain in our status quo scenario, while actually resulting in a
welfare loss in the early tax reform scenario.22
Next, the sensitivity of our results with respect to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=½ can be
22These results stress the importance of allowing for an elastic labor supply in performing an analysis of tax policy in
dynamic general equilibrium models. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
23Benchmark ¯ = :99 Á = :2 Á = 1 ½ = 1 ½ = 5 ¢¿y = ¡:04 ¹ t = 10
KSQ 4.3 4.2 4.6 2.2 3.0 4.2 8.4 2.5
KET 4.0 4.0 4.3 0.9 2.8 3.7 7.7 2.2
NSQ 1.6 1.7 1.9 0.0 1.3 1.6 3.2 1.8
NET 1.7 1.7 1.9 0.0 1.3 1.7 3.2 1.8
Y SQ 2.6 2.6 2.8 0.8 1.9 2.5 5.0 2.0
Y ET 2.5 2.5 2.8 0.3 1.8 2.4 4.8 1.9
CSQ 1.9 2.1 2.1 0.5 0.9 2.1 3.7 1.8
CET 1.9 2.1 2.1 0.2 0.9 2.0 3.7 1.8
BSQ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 6.5
BET 1.4 1.8 1.1 2.3 2.6 1.8 2.7 7.9
TSQ -5.6 -5.4 -5.6 -6.8 -6.2 -5.4 -11.6 -5.3
TET -5.6 -5.3 -5.5 -6.8 -6.2 -5.3 -11.5 -5.2
TRSQ -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.9 -1.6 -1.7 -3.4 -2.1
TRET -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -2.1 -1.6 -1.9 -3.6 -2.3
U
SQ
1 3.1 0.7 1.4 0.0 -0.3 16.6 5.5 -1.1
UET
1 2.3 0.5 1.1 -0.2 -0.3 9.2 4.1 -2.0
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis
read o® columns 5 and 6 of Table 6. Considering ¯rst the case ½ = 1, which corresponds to the case of
a logarithmic utility function, we see that the impact on capital, labor supply, output and consumption
are dampened compared to the benchmark, while the impacts on government debt and tax revenue are
magni¯ed. This is simply explained by the fact, that a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution
implies that individuals are more disposed to postpone consumption as present and future consumption
are better substitutes. But this implies that savings respond only to a lesser extent on changes in tax
rates as the individuals propensity to save is already high. Therefore, as in the case of an inelastic labor
supply the lower willingness to increase savings means that government debt crowds out a larger fraction of
private investment, resulting in a dampened e®ect on long run capital accumulation. Moreover, considering
the welfare impact we see that both tax reform scenarios result in a welfare loss of equal magnitude.
Considering then the case ½ = 5 in column 6 the most notable di®erence compared to the benchmark
is the substantially magni¯ed long run welfare impact. On the other hand, while the impact on the
macroeconomic aggregates di®er only slightly taking all considered cases, i.e. ½ = 1; 3:33 and 5, together
reveals a hump-shaped relationship with respect to the long run impact on the major macroeconomic
aggregates.
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of our results with respect to the design of the tax reform proposal.






















¹ t = 10
2748.0 2748.7
2680.9 2678.3
Table 7: Sensitivity of Social Welfare Results
First we consider the case of a larger drop in income tax rates. As was already mentioned in footnote 17,
our assumption that income tax rates fall by 2 percentage points may indeed understate the true drop in
e®ective income tax rates. Taking a glance at column 7 we see that the impact on the macroeconomic
aggregates approximately doubles if we cut tax rates by 4 percentage points. Second, by setting ¹ t = 10 we
allow the level of government debt to change until 2010. Indeed, as Germany not only failed to pass the
Maastricht criteria in the last years but may do so for the years to come one might regard this assumption
as the more realistic case. Taking a glance at the last column one sees that such a policy implies a
considerable rise in government debt compared to the benchmark, which demands a larger cut in transfers
and halves the tax reform's impact on capital accumulation. All in all this results in a welfare loss in
both scenarios and implies a considerable amount of intergenerational redistribution in favor of present
generations. As already pointed out by Summers (1981) and subsequent authors this last result stresses
that the welfare gains of any tax reform stem from its impact on the process of capital accumulation,
including both physical and human capital. Hence, based on these results one can only hope that the
coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens retrieves back on the road of sound public ¯nance which
they promised to pursue when they overtook the government business some years ago.
Finally, Tables 7 and 8 summarize the sensitivity of our social welfare and political economy results with
respect to the considered parameter variations. As is evident from Table 7 compared to our benchmark






















¹ t = 10
37 63
2 98
Table 8: Sensitivity of Political Economy Results
calibration the results of the social welfare analysis di®er only in the case of ½ = 1, where both tax
reform scenarios are accompanied by a long run welfare loss. In all other cases the qualitative ¯ndings are
unaltered. Next, concerning our analysis of the political economy aspects Table 8 reveals that bringing
forward the tax reform is always the policy preferred by a majority of individuals as was already the case in
our benchmark calibration. On the other hand, in the cases Á = 1 and ¹ t = 10 the option of implementing
the tax reform at all, i.e. our status quo scenario, is now preferred by a majority of voters as opposed to
the option of remaining on the initial BGP.
5 Conclusions
The latest GITR relieves present and future generations from part of their burden by reducing income tax
rates in a series of three stages, which will be ¯nished by January 1, 2005. The present paper focused on
the welfare and macroeconomic e®ects of this ¯scal policy step in the scope of a closed economy overlapping
generations model encompassing 59 generations and an endogenous labor supply decision. In particular,
we quanti¯ed the welfare and macroeconomic consequences induced by the decision to bring the third and
latest stage of the GITR partly forward to January 1, 2004.
As originally outlined the German government planned to ¯nance the drop in income tax rates without
26incurring further debt. Therefore we assumed that the level of government debt, adjusted for population
and productivity growth, will remain constant as of the date of implementation of the tax reform. Our
results for this case indicate that the GITR will be accompanied by a boost in capital accumulation which
results in a capital stock 4:3 percent higher than along the initial balanced growth path, while e®ective
labor supply will rise by 1:6 percent. All in all, this amounts to a long run increase in GDP of 2:6 percent
which re°ects itself in a long run welfare gain of 3:1 percent for future generations.
Contrary to the original outline, the decision to bring forward the latest stage of the GITR was accom-
panied by the decision to partly ¯nance this ¯scal policy step by incurring further government debt. As
a higher level of government debt implies that future generations are more heavily burdened it comes as
no surprise that the long run welfare gain is reduced but still amounts to 2:3 percent. On the other hand,
the di®erences in terms of the macroeconomic e®ects are less pronounced. Thus, the decision to bring
forward the tax reform was a bad thing to do if judged by its long run welfare implications.
For this reason, the decision to stick with the original plan is also the preferred policy if judged by its
social welfare implications, as the long run welfare gains outweigh the short and medium run welfare
gains of present generations induced by bringing forward the tax reform. However, adopting a political
economy view on the subject we asked whether a tax reform option will win a majority vote against the
option of staying on the pursued growth path. At least in the scope of our model the results on this issue
indicate that the GITR would not have won a majority vote, while if being implemented the option to
bring forward the GITR is the policy preferred by a majority of voters.
However, the decision to fund the earlier tax reform by accumulating further debt implies that the cost
of the tax reform are to a greater extent distributed towards the future generations. On the other hand,
as the presently living middle and old aged generations are the losers of the original tax reform proposal
bringing the tax reform forward may be seen as a means of distributing the costs of the tax reform more
evenly across present and future generations. This result holds even if one takes into account the fact that
Germany's current ¯scal policy already implies a substantial amount of intergenerational redistribution
at the expense of future generations as they still gain a non-negligible 2:3 percent in terms of utility.
Finally, at least one caveat regarding our positive evaluation of the GITR should be mentioned. Namely
the assumption that the government holds constant the level of debt, which at least in our simulations
resulted in a declining ratio of government debt to GDP. Remember from our discussion that the di®erences
27between the considered scenarios arise merely because in the 'early tax reform' we allowed government
debt to rise for one period following the implementation of the tax reform, which resulted in a higher long
run level of government debt compared to our status quo scenario. Also, as shown in the scope of our
sensitivity analysis, if the decline in tax revenue following the tax reform is at least partially o®set by
incurring further government debt the long run impact on capital accumulation and welfare gain declines
and in the case considered resulted in a long run welfare loss. Hence, the long run welfare gain which
we documented hinges on our assumption that the government holds constant the level of government
debt. However, despite politician's announcements to balance the budget and to bring down the level of
government debt until today only little has been done in this direction. Therefore, our assumption may
be regarded as unrealistically optimistic, implying that the German Income Tax Reform may indeed be
accompanied by a welfare loss for future generations and a corresponding larger welfare gain for present
generations. Hence, as a larger share of present generations experiences a welfare gain if one employs a less
optimistic assumption about government's attitude towards incurring further debt, this may rationalize
why the approval of the whole tax reform package in 2001 was welcomed by the public.
On the other hand, in the light of this discussion it may be the case that future generations are the losers
of the tax reform package so that the GITR indeed burdens future generations despite the fact that they
face lower income tax rates. Hence, as this may indeed be the more realistic case and based on the grounds
of generational justice one can only hope that the German government retrieves back on the road of sound
public ¯nance which they promised to pursue when they overtook the government business some years
ago.
28A Simulation Methodology
To solve the model numerically we employ value function iteration on a linear-quadratic approximation
(LQ approximation) of the model about its initial steady state. As this approach is extensively discussed
in the literature and well described in Hansen and Prescott (1995) and R¶ ³os-Rull (1996) we only mention
some issues special to the problem at hand.
First, in contrast to the application of value function iteration and LQ approximations in the business cycle
literature we consider a macroeconomic environment which changes over time because of the considered
tax reforms. Hence, the value and policy functions are in general not time-invariant but depend explicitly
on time. On the other hand note, that the changes in the macroeconomic environment are ¯nished as
of the period when the government's budget is adjusted to restore intertemporal budget balance, i.e. as
of model period ¹ t. Afterwards the value and policy functions become time-invariant. Hence, we ¯rst
iterate the value function until convergence to obtain the model's time-invariant solution valid for periods
t ¸ ¹ t. The time-variant value and policy functions for periods t < ¹ t are then obtained by simple backward
recursion starting from the respective time-invariant period ¹ t value functions.
Second, besides time the state of our economy consists of the economy-wide asset distribution and the
level of government debt. While the law of motion to the former is endogenously determined as part of
the solution, the law of motion to the latter is given by the government's budget constraint in (14) which
is a non-linear function of the state. But as we employ a LQ approximation we can only deal with laws
of motion which are linear functions of the state. Hence, to incorporate the law of motion for the level of
government debt we use a linear approximation of the government's budget constraint about the initial
steady state.
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